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21ST CENTURY CURES ACT: THE PROBLEM WITH
PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF DEREGULATION
Megan C. Andersen*
The 21st Century Cures Act introduced innovative changes to the Food and 
Drug Administration’s regulatory processes. In an effort to address the slow, costly, 
and burdensome approval process for high-risk devices, the Cures Act modernized 
clinical trial data by allowing reviewers to determine whether devices merit 
expedited review and to consider post-market surveillance data in the premarket 
approval process. These changes will get life-saving devices to the people who need 
them faster than ever before. But the tradeoff is a greater risk of injury to the 
patient. The 2008 Supreme Court decision Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., held that 
any device receiving premarket approval is federally preempted from state tort 
claims. This means injured patients of medical device malfunctions are barred 
from seeking remedy against the manufacturers. Thus, the Cures Act potentially 
puts patients at greater risk, but does nothing to provide those patients remedies for 
injury.
This Note argues that federal preemption for medical devices receiving 
premarket approval should be reconsidered. Because the regulatory framework for 
which Riegel was decided has now shifted, the Court should reevaluate its prior 
ruling. Additionally, Congress should amend the preemption clause in the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow for state tort action. Finally, Congress should 
create a victim compensation fund, run by HHS, to allow victims to make no-
fault injury claims and receive payments for their suffering.
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INTRODUCTION
The safety and effectiveness of medical devices has been a criti-
cal issue since 1976, when Congress enacted the Medical Device 
Amendments (MDA),1 giving the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) power to regulate medical devices alongside pharmaceuti-
cals and food products. Since then, the FDA has had the immense 
task of assessing the safety and effectiveness of innovative medical 
technology.
Ensuring that medical devices are safe and effective for the in-
tended user is a difficult and burdensome process. It requires the 
FDA to request and review lengthy, complex, and costly scientific 
material provided by the manufacturer that demonstrates the effi-
cacy of the device.2 This process has led many critics to denounce 
the FDA for hurting innovation, preventing life-saving devices from 
reaching the market quickly, and creating a cost-prohibitive sys-
tem.3 Recently, in an effort to assuage those mounting criticisms, 
Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act): an
amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).4 The 
Cures Act allows manufacturers to submit less rigorous data to the 
FDA for the approval of drugs and devices,5 thereby effectively de-
regulating the FDA.
The Cures Act does not change the requirement that manufac-
turers need to provide safety and efficacy evidence.6 It does, how-
1. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see George Horvath, Trading Safety for Innovation 
and Access: An Empirical Evaluation of the FDA’s Premarket Approval Process, 2017 BYU L. REV.
991, 993.
2. Horvath, supra note 1, at 993–94.
3. See, e.g., id. at 994, 1006.
4. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat 1033 (2016) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
5. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, New “21st Century Cures” Legislation: Speed and 
Ease vs. Science, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 581, 581 (2017).
6. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b)(5)(A)–(D), 130 Stat. 
1033, 1129 (2016) (stating that “[n]othing in this paragraph alters the standards for pre-
market approval of a device.”). Note that the sections in the FDCA and Cures Act are num-
bered differently, even though they refer to the same language. This is because I refer to the 
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ever, implicitly encourage the FDA to emphasize speed over scien-
tific rigor.7 This tacit understanding—that life-saving devices 
should no longer spend years awaiting approval—creates a ques-
tion about safety. Specifically, will the assessment of high-risk med-
ical devices under this new Cures Act standard remain rigorous 
enough to ensure patient safety?
In 2008, the Supreme Court held in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. that 
the federal government preempts tort claims with respect to medi-
cal devices that received FDA premarket approval (PMA).8 The 
Court looked at the PMA process and found that the FDA approves 
medical devices based on a rigorous standard of safety and effec-
tiveness.9 Thus, because the FDA has already concluded the devices 
are safe and effective, claimants cannot assert tort claims predicat-
ed on device safety.10 The case led to injured patients with minimal 
recourse since their claims against device manufacturers are 
barred.
This ruling should be reconsidered. Both the Cures Act and the 
FDA demonstrate a trend toward deregulation. The lowered stand-
ards of the PMA process help expedite innovation, but they also 
risk patient safety. As the standards of rigor are being lowered at 
the FDA, so too should the device industry’s shield against liability.
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the FDA and the 
regulatory scheme for medical devices. This Note first describes 
the goals of the FDA and how the agency regulates devices through 
the FDCA and the MDA. It then discusses the approval process for 
medical devices through both the premarket notification and 
premarket approval processes. This section ends with a short dis-
cussion of the Supreme Court case Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. and the 
preemptive effect the case has upon tort liability related to faulty 
high-risk medical devices.
Part II discusses the changes which the Cures Act makes to the 
FDCA and the approval process for medical devices. This section 
analyzes two device amendments from both a textual and proce-
dural perspective. Specifically, §§ 3051 and 3058 lay out how the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary 
should take more “flexible” approaches in reviewing PMA applica-
tions. Combined, the sections highlight how the Cures Act both 
lowers the rigor of scientific data and makes it necessary to do only 
Cures Act as public law, i.e., what Congress put together to present the Act as legislation. 
The FDCA is located in the United States Code, which has its own numbering system based 
on when the Act was codified.
7. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 5, at 582.
8. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008).
9. Id. at 317–18.
10. Id. at 330.
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the minimum number of clinical trials, deferring safety and effec-
tiveness tests until after the device is already on the market and 
used by patients.
Part III reviews past instances of device malfunctions and how 
failures in the regulatory system contributed to the problem. While 
the Cures Act is too recent to provide direct evidence of lax regula-
tory standards for device approval, Part III examines past cases to 
reveal a pattern of risk and injury to patients and consumers of 
medical devices. Post-market surveillance studies are particularly 
scrutinized, since the Cures Act prominently relies on post-market 
evaluation for device approval.
Part IV evaluates potential solutions to provide victims of faulty 
medical devices remedies. Judicial override and Congressional 
amendments are analyzed and rejected as impractical due to the 
structure of government and political will of Congress. However, 
the creation of a victim compensation fund is one promising re-
medial route. While this fund would still need to be enacted by 
Congress, it would delegate authority to HHS and the FDA to 
compensate medical device failure victims. This solution avoids 
clogging up the court system, while still providing compensation to 
victims of medical device malfunction.
Part VI concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The FDA and the Medical Device Regulatory Structure
The FDA protects the public health by ensuring the safety, effi-
cacy, and security of drugs, biological products and medical devic-
es.11 Congress passed the FDCA in 1938 to empower the FDA to 
exert more control over drugs and food.12 Notably, the authority to 
regulate medical devices was missing from the FDCA. In 1976, 
Congress passed the MDA to establish a comprehensive scheme for 
the premarket and post-market regulation of devices.13
11. What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/ (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
12. How Did the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Come About?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214416.htm (last up-
dated Aug 22, 2018).
13. Jeffrey K. Shapiro, The Medical Device Amendments of 1976: The Statute That Went Awry, FDA L.
BLOG (June 3, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2013/06/the-medical-device-amendments-
of-1976-the-statute-that-went-awry/.
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The MDA gave the FDA authority to regulate all types of medical 
devices and classify them into three categories based on their per-
ceived risk.14 Class I devices pose almost no risk and are minimally 
regulated by “general controls.”15 Examples of Class I devices in-
clude band-aids and tongue depressors.16 Class II devices, like ul-
trasounds, are potentially more dangerous and are regulated using 
the premarket notification pathway.17 Class III devices are high-risk 
devices that either “presen[t] a potential unreasonable risk of ill-
ness or injury,” or are “purported or represented to be for a use in 
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of sub-
stantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” 
and are regulated under the premarket approval (PMA) pathway.18
Many types of implants, like heart valves or breast implants, are 
regulated as Class III medical devices.19 Due to their perceived risk, 
devices regulated under the PMA process must provide evidence of 
reasonable assurance of their “safety and effectiveness.”20
Low-risk devices, Class I, are exempt from premarket review, but 
most moderate- and high-risk devices, Class II and Class III respec-
tively, must submit an application to the FDA before marketing to 
the public.21 All Class II and some Class III devices qualify for the 
abbreviated application process, called the premarket notification 
or 510(k), if they are predicated on an existing FDA-approved 
medical device.22 The manufacturers of such devices only need to 
show one of the following: (1) “substantial equivalence,” (2) that 
the device has the same technological characteristics and intended 
use as the predicate, or (3) that the device has the same intended 
use as the predicate and different technological characteristics that 
do not raise questions about its safety and effectiveness.23
14. JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES
3 (2016).
15. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2018); JOHNSON, supra 
note 14, at 3, 5.
16. Elastic Bandage, 21 C.F.R. § 880.5075(b) (2018); Tongue Depressor, 21 C.F.R. § 
880.6230(b) (2018).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2018); JOHNSON, supra note 14.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2018); JOHNSON, supra note 14.
19. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 5 tbl.I.
20. Id.
21. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 5–6.
22. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE 510(K) PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL 
EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS [510(K)]: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 3 (2014).
23. Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYour
Device/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification510k/default.htm#se (last updated 
Sept. 27, 2018).
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B. Premarket Approval
The PMA is the FDA’s most stringent type of device regulatory 
review. The application requires the manufacturer to submit all 
available scientific knowledge concerning investigations; clinical 
and nonclinical data of the device’s safety and effectiveness; de-
tailed information regarding its design, components, ingredients, 
properties, and principles of operation; any applicable perfor-
mance standards; and other information deemed relevant by the 
FDA.24 In addition to these application requirements and agency 
review, the FDA may request additional data from the manufactur-
er or refer it to an outside panel of experts.25 All of this infor-
mation is necessary because PMA approval is based on the deter-
mination that the device is safe and effective for its intended use or 
uses.26
Completing the PMA application is both time-consuming and 
expensive. According to a 2010 independent analysis, “the average 
total cost from concept to approval was approximately $94 million” 
for PMAs, with $75 million spent on clinical stages required by the 
FDA application process.27 The same study showed that from first 
communication with the FDA, it took an average of fifty-four 
months for FDA reviewers to make a determination on the device.28
Clearance rate, which factors in only the time the manufacturer 
first filed its application with the FDA to the determination of safe-
ty and effectiveness, is around 264 days;29 this runs up against the 
FDA’s guidelines, which state it should take only 180 days to review 
a PMA and make a determination.30
Once the FDA makes a determination, the manufacturer cannot 
make changes in design specifications, manufacturing processes, 
labeling, or any other attribute, that would affect safety or effec-
tiveness.31 While the PMA process is burdensome, FDA Commis-
sioner Scott Gottlieb recently touted it as “the gold standard when 
24. Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Federal Preemption of State Common-Law Products Liability 
Claims Pertaining to Medical Devices, Implants, and Other Health-Related Items, 74 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 
1, § I.2 (2018).
25. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(G) (2018); 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2018).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(C) (2018).
27. JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: A
SURVEY OF OVER 200 MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 7 (2010).
28. Id. at 6.
29. Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarket
submissions/premarketapprovalpma/#overview (last updated Sept. 27, 2018).
30. Id.
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(5)(A)(i) (2018).
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it comes to device safety.”32 Of the thousands of medical devices 
approved by the FDA, very few turn out to be unsafe or ineffec-
tive.33 Nonetheless, a study conducted by George Horvath found 
that “under a best-case scenario at least 4.6%–6% of PMA-approved 
devices will fail in such a way as to threaten death or serious and 
permanent harm.”34 So, while clinical trials are the “gold standard” 
for the FDA to establish safety and effectiveness,35 this is actually 
more true for drugs than devices.36 Despite the rigorous and strin-
gent standards and demands for evidence-based science, not all 
approved PMAs are backed by high-quality randomized controlled 
clinical trials.37 Section III discusses the implications of patient safe-
ty due to the regulatory procedures.
C. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
A prominent case of medical device failure occurred in 2008.
Charles Riegel underwent coronary artery surgery and, during the 
angioplasty, the catheter ruptured causing extreme complications. 
The Riegels brought a lawsuit against Medtronic, the manufacturer 
of the catheter, alleging strict liability; breach of implied warranty; 
negligence of design, testing, inspection, distribution, and label-
ing; and negligent manufacturing, as well as other claims.38 The 
Supreme Court denied the Riegels relief, holding that the MDA 
preempted the Riegel’s common-law tort claims,39 leaving the Rie-
gels without remedy from Medtronic.
32. Thomas M. Burton, Do the FDA’s Regulations Governing Medical Devices Need to be Over-
hauled?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/do-the-fdas-regulations-
of-medical-devices-need-to-be-overhauled-1427079649.
33. Id.
34. Horvath, supra note 1, at 992.
35. Laura E. Bothwell et al., Assessing the Gold Standard—Lessons from the History of RCTs,
374 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2175, 2175 (2016).
36. See generally Annetine C. Gelijns, Appendix A: Comparing the Development of Drugs, De-
vices, and Clinical Procedures, in MODERN METHODS OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATION: MEDICAL 
INNOVATION AT THE CROSSROADS 147 (1990).
Most Phase II studies are double-blinded, randomized controlled clinical tri-
als . . . . The well-designed randomized controlled trial (RCT) is generally regard-
ed as the statistically most powerful method to determine efficacy . . . . Tradition-
ally, most device evaluations lack randomized control groups. While this may in 
part be due to less sophistication in clinical research on the part of many device 
manufacturers, it may also result from inherent characteristics of device develop-
ment that make the classical RCT more difficult to perform.
Id. at 157, 167–68.
37. Sanket S. Dhruva et al., Strength of Study Evidence Examined by the FDA in Premarket 
Approval of Cardiovascular Devices, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2679, 2683 (2009).
38. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320–21 (2008).
39. Id. at 325.
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Here, the Court first reviewed the relevant section, 360k, in the 
MDA. Section 360k provides an express preemption clause affirm-
ing that no state may establish requirements different, or in addi-
tion to, device safety or effectiveness requirements established by 
the MDA.40 The Court found that the word “requirements” in the 
section includes a state’s common-law duties.41 The Court then re-
viewed the regulation promulgated by the FDA that specified state 
requirements are preempted “only when the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration has established specific counterpart regulations or 
there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular de-
vice. . . .”42 The Court interpreted the FDA’s “specific requirements 
applicable to a particular device” to mean the device review pro-
cess.
The Court then reasoned that, because the premarket approval 
process is rigorous and specific to individual devices, preemption 
applies.43 The Court compared the fact pattern here to the prece-
dent case, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, which analyzed preemption of the 
lower-risk approval process: the 510(k).44 Under the 510(k) path-
way, device manufacturers need only show “substantial equiva-
lence” to an already FDA-approved device. In Lohr, the Court held
that there was no preemption for 510(k) devices since the review 
was predicated on equivalence, and not safety and effectiveness.45
In the case of the PMA, however, “it is in no sense an exemption 
from federal safety review—it is federal safety review.”46 Thus, any 
tort claims of safety and effectiveness would contradict the reason-
able assurance by the FDA that the device was in fact safe and ef-
fective.
Scholars argue that the Riegel decision represents a safe harbor 
for device manufacturers who obtain a PMA for their product, be-
cause the device manufacturer escapes tort liability, regardless of 
the harms caused and the number of people injured.47 To a certain 
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or po-
litical subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device in-
tended for human use any requirement— (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to 
the device under this Act.”).
41. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324.
42. Id. at 322; see also 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2018).
43. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–24.
44. Id.
45. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
46. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323.
47. See generally Demetria D. Frank-Jackson, The Medical Device Federal Preemption Trilogy: 
Salvaging Due Process for Injured Patients, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453 (2011); John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the Common Law of Torts, 65 
DEPAUL L. REV. 433 (2016); Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of Preempting Tort 
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extent, protecting device manufacturers makes sense because of 
the societal value of imperfect medical devices: if devices were per-
fectly safe, then nothing would be approved and society would not 
have access to innovative, life-saving technology.48 However, the 
Cures Act weighs more heavily in favor of regulatory speed and in-
novation than safety and effectiveness. Section II evaluates the lat-
est changes made to the regulatory system and assesses whether 
Riegel now represents an outdated position concerning the PMA 
process.
II. THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT
The Cures Act enacts innovative changes to the way the FDA 
regulates food, drugs, and medical devices. Congress passed this 
landmark legislation in 2016 with bipartisan support, with the goal 
of accelerating the discovery, development, and delivery of new 
cures and treatments.49 The bill also had strong support from the 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device industries be-
cause it purported to modernize the clinical trials systems and ac-
celerate the development of new medical products.50 The approval 
process for drugs and devices was “a relic of another era” and Con-
gress was determined to enhance the system to keep pace with rap-
idly accelerating innovation.51
The Cures Act functions as an amendment: adding and chang-
ing provisions to the FDCA. The changes pertaining to medical de-
vices are laid out in Subtitle F “Medical Device Innovations,” 
§§ 3051 to 3060.52 Two sections in particular have a significant im-
pact on patient safety: §§ 3051 and 3058.
Litigation: FDA Regulation of Medical Devices Lawrence, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2313 (2008);
George Horvath, Recovery and Preemption: The Collision of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act and 
the Medical Device Amendments, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1353 (2015); Arlen W. Langvardt, Generic 
Pharmaceuticals and the “Unfortunate Hand” Dealt to Harmed Consumers: The Emerging State Court 
Resistance, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 565 (2016).
48. See generally Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs and Devices: Comparison of European and U.S. 
Approval Processes, 1 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 399 (2016) (outlin-
ing the ways in which regulators in Europe and the United States use approval processes to 
address the risks that medical devices may pose).
49. Pat Stricker, The 21st Century Cures Act: A Model For Change, CMSATODAY,
http://www.naylornetwork.com/cmsatoday/articles/index-
v3.asp?aid=415957&issueID=53656 (last visited Jan. 28, 2019)
50. Peggy Eastman, 21st Century Cures Act Aims to Speed Approvals of New Drugs & Devices,
38 ONCOLOGY TIMES 18, 18 (2016).
51. Stricker, supra note 49.
52. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 1034–35 (2016).
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A. §§ 3051 and 3058
One important addition to the FDCA is § 3051, describing 
“breakthrough” devices. § 3051(a) provides, “[t]he purpose of this 
section is to encourage . . . and provide the Secretary with suffi-
cient authority, to apply efficient and flexible approaches to expe-
dite the development of . . . devices that represent breakthrough 
technologies.”53 Section (a) grants the Secretary with discretion to 
facilitate new devices through the regulatory system. Section (b) 
then clarifies some of this power by detailing the structure the Sec-
retary may use to expedite approval for select devices:
The Secretary shall establish a program to expedite the de-
velopment of, and provide for the priority review for, de-
vices . . . that represent breakthrough technologies . . . that 
offer significant advantages over existing approved or 
cleared alternatives . . . [or] the availability of which is in 
the best interest of patients.54
Another substantial change to the FDA’s regulatory regime is §
3058’s amendment to the least burdensome device review stand-
ard. The FDA defines “least burdensome” as “a successful means of 
addressing a premarket issue that involves the most appropriate in-
vestment of time, effort, and resources on the part of industry and 
FDA.”55 This type of review already exists in the FDCA, but the 
Cures Act tweaks this standard to allow for a more deregulatory ef-
fect.56 In addition to requiring that the Secretary consider the least 
burdensome appropriate means in requesting information, the 
statute also requires that the Secretary consider “the role of post-
market information in . . . demonstrating a reasonable assurance 
of device safety and effectiveness.”57
53. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3051(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1121 (2016).
54. Id. § 3051(b).
55. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS OF THE FDA
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 1, 2 (2002).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2018).
57. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b)(5)(A)–(D), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1129 (2016). The section provides in full:
(A) In requesting additional information with respect to an application 
under this section, the Secretary shall consider the least burdensome 
appropriate means necessary to demonstrate a reasonable assurance of 
device safety and effectiveness. . . . (C) For purposes of this paragraph, 
the Secretary shall consider the role of postmarket information in de-
termining the least burdensome means of demonstrating a reasonable 
assurance of device safety and effectiveness. (D) Nothing in this para-
graph alters the standards for premarket approval of a device.
Id.
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B. Potential Downsides of §§ 3051 and 3058
§§ 3051 and 3058 go a long way toward increasing Congress’s 
goal of modernizing the clinical approval process and speeding in-
novative technology from bench to bedside. § 3051 establishes a 
breakthrough device pathway that reinforces the existing priority 
review pathway, and § 3058 mandates that FDA reviewers consider 
the least burdensome means necessary for demonstrating a rea-
sonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.58 By design, these sec-
tions are somewhat malleable, allowing the Secretary of HHS to 
expedite any type of device he or she deems to be “in the best in-
terests of patients.”59 Likewise, the ability to expedite devices that 
“offer significant advantages” over existing or cleared devices, or 
that are “in the best interest of patients,” implies subjectivity in re-
view standards that could accelerate approval.60 Thus, approvals 
may hinge on reviewers’ beliefs regarding the utility of the device 
and not on complete clinical data.61
The Cures Act specifically delegates authority to the Secretary of 
HHS to choose a select number of devices that will go through the 
flexible approval process, but leaves ambiguous the meaning of §
3051’s standards. Guidance documents for the FDA outline criteria 
for breakthrough devices. The draft documents state that a spon-
sor must “demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the device could 
provide for more effective treatment or diagnosis of the disease or 
condition identified in the proposed indications for use.”62
Demonstrating a “reasonable expectation” of success could mean 
providing “literature or preliminary data (bench, animal, or clini-
cal).”63 However, relying on applications primarily supported by 
bench or animal data could potentially lead to inconsistent review 
for certain types of devices because the devices have not yet been 
adequately tested in humans.64 It is still unclear what this could 
58. See id. §§ 3051, 3058.
59. Id. § 3051(b).
60. Id. § 3051(b)(2)(C)–(D).
61. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BREAKTHROUGH DEVICES PROGRAM: DRAFT 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 9 (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Guidanc
eDocuments/UCM581664.pdf (stating a complete set of clinical data is not required for ap-
proval).
62. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. See Malcolm R. Macleod et al., Good Laboratory Practice: Preventing Introduction of Bias 
at the Bench, 29 J. CEREBRAL BLOOD FLOW & METABOLISM 221 (2009) (providing that bench 
data is susceptible to experimental bias and based off of researcher hypotheses); see also
John P. Gibbs, et al., Bedside to Bench: Integrating Quantitative Clinical Pharmacology and Reverse 
Translation to Optimize Drug Development, 103 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 196, 
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mean for patient safety and safety/effectiveness standards for Class 
III devices expedited through this pathway.
Section 3058 also includes unclear standards and creates discre-
tionary and subjective criteria. In the FDA’s draft guiding princi-
ples, “least burdensome” means “the minimum amount of infor-
mation necessary to adequately address a regulatory question or 
issue through the most efficient manner at the right time (e.g., 
need to know versus nice to know).”65 But under the Cures Act, 
post-market information takes on a leading role of demonstrating 
safety and effectiveness.66 The FDA provides that post-market stud-
ies are only appropriate in certain circumstances, such as modify-
ing labeling, assessing long-term performance, and confirming 
bench data.67 Thus, a reviewer adhering to the least burdensome 
review standard could approve a device based on promising bench 
trial data and rely on post-market surveillance for confirmation of 
safety and effectiveness. But, it seems counterintuitive to mandate 
reviewers to rely on uncollected data to approve a device as safe 
and effective.
Benefit-risk determinations calculate the risk of clearing devices 
predicated on post-market data collection.68 The FDA states that: 
“there is never 100% certainty when determining reasonable assur-
ance of safety and effectiveness of a device. However, the degree of 
certainty of the benefits and risks of a device is a factor we consider 
when making benefit-risk determinations.”69 The Guidance for 
Benefit-Risk determination lists multiple factors, such as magni-
tude of benefits and severity of risks, but also lists patient perspec-
tive as an evaluation criterion.70 These criteria indicate that the 
FDA would never approve an obviously risky device based solely on 
observational data. But despite the FDA’s best efforts, discretionary 
196 (2018) (emphasizing that bench data is valuable for refining target selection and valida-
tion, however, “mechanistic insights are needed for gaining full understanding.”).
65. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS 8 (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Guidanc
eDocuments/UCM588914.pdf.
66. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b)(5)(C), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1129 (2016).
67. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BALANCING PREMARKET AND POSTMARKET DATA 
COLLECTION FOR DEVICES SUBJECT TO PREMARKET APPROVAL: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 9–13 (2015).
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. (quoting U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN MAKING 
BENEFIT-RISK DETERMINATIONS IN MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET APPROVAL AND DE NOVO 
CLASSIFICATIONS 11 (2012)).
70. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FACTORS TO CONSIDER REGARDING BENEFIT-RISK IN 
MEDICAL DEVICE PRODUCT AVAILABILITY, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 9 (2016).
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factors exist in many of the FDA review standards that reviewers 
can use when approving Class III medical devices.
Section 3058 of the Cures Act increases review subjectivity be-
cause reviewers are required to consider the “least burdensome 
means” principal to demonstrate a reasonable assurance of safety 
and effectiveness.71 However, while the FDA has development re-
quirements to help guide device reviewers, it has yet to develop 
performance metrics to evaluate them.72 In 2002, the FDA stated 
that it planned to periodically assess the implementation of the 
least burdensome principles, but without performance metrics, use 
of least burdensome means is discretionary.73 The Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) found that “until such measures are de-
veloped and used, FDA will not be able to evaluate whether it ef-
fectively and consistently applies a least burdensome approach in 
its medical device reviews.”74 According to GAO, it appears that ex-
ercise of the “least burdensome means” is subject to the discretion 
of the reviewer.
Furthermore, while the drug approval process necessitates clini-
cal trials, § 3058 makes it clear this “gold standard” is not the prior-
ity for devices.75 Instead, proposals based off of the language of the 
Cures Act suggest “ ‘shorter or smaller clinical trials’ for devices 
and the request that the FDA develop criteria for relying on ‘evi-
dence from clinical experience,’ including ‘observational studies, 
registries, and therapeutic use’ instead of randomized, controlled 
trials for approving new uses for existing drugs.”76 Studies suggest 
that these approaches are not as rigorous or as valid as randomized 
trials in assessing efficacy.77 While § 3058 specifically states that it 
will not alter the standards for PMAs,78 it encourages less rigorous 
science and more discretion in decision-making in reality.
71. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b)(5)(A), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1129 (2016). Note that for purposes of statutory interpretation, “shall” is meant to refer to 
actions that are mandatory, whereas “may” is interpreted to mean optional.
72. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-140, FDA MEDICAL DEVICE REVIEWS:
EVALUATION IS NEEDED TO ASSURE REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOLLOW A 
LEAST BURDENSOME APPROACH 23–26 (2017).
73. Id. at 26–27.
74. Introduction to id.
75. See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143534.htm
(last updated Nov. 24, 2017); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 72, at 4.
76. Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The 21st Century Cures Act—Will It Take Us Back 
in Time?, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2473, 2474 (2015).
77. Id.
78. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b)(5)(D), 130 Stat. 1033, 1129 
(2016).
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III. WHAT THIS COULD MEAN FOR PATIENT SAFETY
The Cures Act has only been in operation for a short period of 
time and the immediate effects of a more flexible and discretion-
ary standard for medical devices cannot yet be directly assessed. 
Predictions can be made based on the past trends of medical de-
vice performance, however. This section analyzes several cases of 
device failures and anticipates how the Cures Act could potentially 
exacerbate this type of problem in the future. Specifically, it at-
tempts to show how the failures in safety and efficacy review under 
the pre-Cures Act approval process are actually the methods of ap-
proval that the Cures Act favors. Because the Cures Act encourages 
practices that have led to device recalls, this Note predicts more in-
cidents of device failure and more injury to patients will occur.
A. Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Failures and Consequences
One of the most infamous failures of Class III devices was the 
Sprint Fidelis Lead wire fracture. Manufactured by Medtronic, the 
Sprint Fidelis Leads were specific models of cardiac electrodes, or 
thin wires that connected an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator 
(ICD) directly to a patient’s heart.79 The primary purpose of the 
leads was to prevent sudden cardiac death by sending shocks to the 
heart when sensing irregular heart rhythms.80 In testing its wires, 
Medtronic relied on stress testing—tests meant to recreate the 
pressures of the body—rather than on clinical trials.81 And despite 
this, in June 2004, the FDA approved a PMA supplement for the 
Sprint Fidelis Leads.82
Implantation of ICDs for prevention of sudden cardiac death is 
an accepted treatment strategy for high-risk patients.83 Lead failure 
has been a known risk for several decades,84 yet the benefits of 
ICDs are critical in preventing acute myocardial infarction, myo-
79. Defective Medtronic Sprint Fidelis Leads Malfunctioning, CLASS ACTION (Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://www.classaction.org/medtronic-sprint-fidelis-lead.
80. Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator, AM. HEART ASS’N,
https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/arrhythmia/prevention—treatment-of-
arrhythmia/implantable-cardioverter-defibrillator-icd (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
81. Burton, supra note 32; see also Medtronic Defibrillator Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall, BEASLEY 
ALLEN (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.beasleyallen.com/news/medtronic-defibrillator-sprint-
fidelis-lead-recall/.
82. In re Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2010).
83. P.F.H.M. van Dessel, The Sprint Fidelis Lead Fracture Story: Time to Come to Our Senses?,
18 NETH. HEART J. 4, 4 (2010).
84. Id.
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cardial ischemia, and electrolyte imbalance and drug toxicity.85
The problem with Sprint Fidelis was that the leads were prone to 
fracture in a small number of patients, and about 2% of patients 
were estimated to experience lead fracture within 30 months.86 The 
fractured leads could cause a defibrillator to fail to deliver a lifesav-
ing shock or to fire for no reason. After five patients died due to 
lead failure, Medtronic pulled the models from the market.87 By
the time they acted, though, approximately 268,000 patients were
implanted with the Sprint Fidelis Leads.88
After Medtronic recalled their product, patients began consider-
ing having the faulty wires removed. Because the leads were im-
planted directly on or into the heart, though, surgery to remove 
the wires was incredibly dangerous and even fatal. By 2009, four 
patients had died from doctors’ efforts to surgically remove the 
leads.89
One reason why the Sprint Fidelis situation is often cited as an 
infamous failure of medical innovation and FDA regulation is be-
cause of the large number of patients who were implanted with the 
leads before its recall. Over 250,000 people were implanted with 
the Sprint Fidelis Leads and an estimated 150,000 people in the 
United States still have them today.90 Sprint Fidelis represents the 
failure of the FDA to properly protect patients from faulty medical 
device innovation, and underscores the leniency of the PMA 
standards in practice. These leads were approved with evidence of 
stress tests, not through more rigorous clinical trials.91 This is exact-
ly the type of “reasonable expectation”92 of success shown through 
bench, animal, or clinical evidence that the Cures Act encourages 
for modernized PMAs.
While this example reveals certain flaws of the FDA’s regulation 
of Class III medical devices, it also shows that, overall, the FDA’s 
regulation is effective. There is no recent comparable case to 
Sprint Fidelis in terms of scale and mortality, despite thousands of 
medical devices being approved in the interim. The fact that Sprint 
85. See generally van Dessel, supra note 83; see also Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator, su-
pra note 80.
86. Defective Medtronic Sprint Fidelis Leads Malfunctioning, CLASS ACTION (Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://www.classaction.org/medtronic-sprint-fidelis-lead.
87. Barry Meier, Removing Medtronic Heart Cables is Hard Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/business/07device.html.
88. van Dessel, supra note 83.
89. Mikhael F. El-Chami et al., Outcomes of Sprint Fidelis and Riata Lead Extraction: Data 
From 2 High-Volume Centers, 12 HEART RHYTHM 1216, 1218 (2015).
90. Barry Meier, Medtronic Links Device for Heart to 13 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/business/14device.html.
91. Medtronic Defibrillator Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall, supra note 81.
92. Id.
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Fidelis happened over a decade ago indicates that the FDA has a 
safer and more robust process for evaluating medical devices. 
When asked about failure prevention, FDA Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb remarked, 
[t]he failure of any defibrillator lead is tragic, but to por-
tray the malfunction of Medtronic’s lead as an example of a 
device failure that could have been avoided through a big-
ger clinical trial gives short shrift to the basic science and 
engineering challenges that permeate this type of problem, 
and how one tries to prevent it from occurring. Keep in 
mind that 99.8% of all medical devices have no serious ad-
verse events associated with them.93
Commissioner Gottlieb is right—medical devices are not like 
drugs. Most devices cannot be tested through rigorous double-
blind controlled clinical trials like pharmaceuticals are.94 And while 
sham medical device procedures do occur, they tend to cause 
“moral discomfort in clinician-investigators” who are “[t]rained to 
perform invasive interventions only for the medical benefit of pa-
tients” but find themselves administering fake procedures and cre-
ating false beliefs in patient-subjects.95
In 2017, medical device maker St. Jude Medical failed to recall 
their defibrillators for faulty batteries. The lithium batteries in the 
ICD, implanted under the skin by the collarbone, were short-
circuiting, causing two deaths and serious adverse effects in dozens 
of other patients.96 The same thing that happened in early 2000s
also happened a decade later. A device that patients relied on to 
live led to death and serious injury. This time, however, 400,000 
people worldwide were affected.97
One large similarity between the two device failures is that both 
Medtronic and St. Judes Medical not only ignored studies showing 
their defibrillators were malfunctioning, but they also failed to 
properly report these studies to the FDA. In the case of the Sprint 
Fidelis Leads, before Medtronic issued a recall, it had known about 
93. Burton, supra note 32.
94. Rita F. Redberg, Sham Controls in Medical Device Trials, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 892,
892–83 (2014).
95. Franklin G. Miller & Ted J. Kaptchuk, Sham Procedures and the Ethics of Clinical Trials,
97 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 576, 576 (2004).
96. Katie Thomas, St. Jude Medical Played Down Defibrillator Failures for Years, F.D.A. Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/health/st-jude-medical-
defibrillator-abbot-fda.html.
97. Id.
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the fracturing problem for months.98 Prior to the recall, there were 
over one hundred reports of lead fracturing and since then there 
have been over a thousand reports of fractures.99 When the FDA 
conducted inspections of the leads, it revealed deficiencies of FDA 
Current Good Manufacturing Practices, citing “[f]ailure to estab-
lish and maintain adequate procedures for validating the device 
design; and [f]ailure to establish and maintain adequate proce-
dures for implementing corrective and preventive action.”100 The 
FDA previously issued two Warning Letters to Medtronic prior to 
the 2007 recall.101 Yet, despite these warnings and reports, Med-
tronic failed to act.102
In the case of the St. Judes’ defibrillator, physicians at Duke 
University and the University of Illinois reported cases of battery 
problems with the devices in 2014 and 2015.103 St. Jude fixed the 
problem for new defibrillators, but failed to recall the defective 
models and did not alert doctors or patients of the potential risk 
for malfunction.104 These defibrillators were approved under the 
non-Cures Act rigorous standard, yet faulty manufacturing prolif-
erated without recourse. The Cures Act could thus promote more 
device-failure incidents by favoring tests like Medtronic’s stress-test 
and by leaning more heavily on post-market surveillance studies 
with which companies may or may not comply.
B. The Problems with Post-Market Surveillance
The Cures Act may be less effective than envisioned and cause 
more harm to patients because of manufacturers’ and hospitals’ 
consistent and systematic underreporting of issues.105 As seen in the 
98. See Meier, supra note 90; Medtronic Defibrillator Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall, supra note 81.
99. Medtronic Defibrillator Sprint Fidelis Lead Recall, supra note 81.
100. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 2–6 
(2008), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/
UCM129810.pdf.
101. Id.
102. See Tom Lamb, Sprint Fidelis Lead Wire Defect Litigation Comes to an Apparent Disap-
pointing End (Medtronic Wins), DRUG INJ. WATCH (Nov. 10, 2010), https://www.drug-
injury.com/druginjurycom/2010/11/medtronic-sprint-fidelis-litigation-settlement-followed-
by-federal-preemption-ruling-affirmed.html (noting that Medtronic settled many of its cases, 
while many others were found to be preempted under Riegel).
103. Thomas, supra note 96.
104. Id.
105. See James R. Ward & P. John Clarkson, An Analysis of Medical Device-Related Errors: 
Prevalence and Possible Solutions, 28 J. MED. ENGINEERING & TECH. 1, 5 (2009) (describing un-
derreporting rates for device-related medical errors ranging from ten to eighty percent); see 
also A Delicate Balance: FDA and the Reform of the Medical Device Approval Process: Hearing Before 
the Spec. Comm. on Aging, 112th Cong. 81, 88 (2011) (statement of Ralph D. Hall, Distin-
guished Professor and Practitioner, University of Minnesota Law School).
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defibrillator’s context, both Medtronic and St. Judes knew there 
were issues with their products, yet, they both failed to act. This 
problem extends beyond manufacturers, though. Hospitals and 
consumers also fail to report medical device malfunctions.106 This 
calls into question the Cures Act’s reliance on the FDA reliably ap-
proving devices based on predictions of successful post-market sur-
veillance.
The FDA provides mandatory reporting guidelines for manufac-
turers, importers, and Device User Facilities, but lacks compliance
enforcement provisions. Manufacturers must report deaths, serious 
injuries and malfunctions to the FDA within 30 days of learning of 
the adverse event.107 Hospitals and outpatient facilities must report 
suspected medical-device-related deaths to the manufacturer and 
the FDA, but can report serious injuries only to the manufactur-
er.108 Doctors are not required to report adverse events to the FDA 
at all, and studies show that many do not bother.109
Medical providers play a significant role in failing to report med-
ical product issues to the FDA. One prominent example of multi-
ple hospitals’ failures to report issues is in the context of laparo-
scopic power morcellators: bladed power tools that gynecologists
use to perform hysterectomies through small incisions.110 The de-
vice failure became publicized when it was discovered that the 
morcellators were spreading and worsening undetected cancers.111
In response to the public outcry, the FDA investigated and 
106. Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation 
of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 951, 953, 975.
107. Mandatory Reporting Requirements: Manufacturers, Importers and Device User Facilities,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationand
Guidance/PostmarketRequirements/ReportingAdverseEvents/default.htm (last updated 
Sept. 27, 2018).
108. Id.
109. Anna A. Gagliardi et al., Factors influencing the Reporting of Adverse Medical Device 
Events: Qualitative Interviews with Physicians about Higher Risk Implantable Devices, BMJ QUALITY 
& SAFETY 1, Aug. 2 2017, at 1 (finding many physicians believe ADME reporting is unneces-
sary); Stephen Barlas, FDA Flags Inconsistent Hospital Reporting of Medical Device Problems: Hazy 
Reporting Rules Beget Confusion, 42 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 97, 98 (2017) (describing hos-
pital underreporting of devices causing death, serious injury or illness, or a malfunction); 
DEP’T OF HUMAN AND HEALTH SERVICES OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ADVERSE EVENT 
REPORTING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES (2009) (stating that the majority of adverse event reports 
were made by manufacturers and voluntary reporters make up a small percentage of the 
total reports made).
110. Jon Kamp & Jennifer Levitz, FDA Presses Hospitals on Medical-Tool Problems, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 2, 2016, 11:13 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-presses-hospitals-on-medical-
device-problems-1480690803. Morcellators are actually Class II medical devices that were 
approved under the 510(k). However, I use this example to show flaws in the post-market 
surveillance system, not the FDA’s safety and efficacy review. Laparoscopic Power Morcellators,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/
productsandmedicalprocedures/surgeryandlifesupport/ucm584463.htm (last updated Aug. 
22, 2018).
111. Kamp & Levitz, supra note 110.
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acknowledged that no one, including hospitals, filed reports until 
after the media publicized problems.112 Some hospitals knew how 
to notify the FDA or device manufacturers, but did not submit the 
required reports for deaths or serious injuries, and in some cases, 
“did not have adequate procedures in place for reporting device-
related death or serious injury events to FDA or to the manufac-
turers.”113 Based on the FDA’s inspection, a report found that hos-
pitals are not alone in their limited, sometimes non-existent, re-
porting to the FDA or to manufacturers.114 The report further 
concluded that staff members were neither aware of, nor trained to 
comply with, reporting requirements.115
The FDA plays its own role in failing to follow-up on post-market 
studies.116 When the FDA began regulating medical devices in 1976 
after the passage of the MDA, all existing medical devices on the 
market were grandfathered into the regulatory scheme.117 Those 
devices were allowed to remain on the market as long as they sub-
mitted evidence showing safety and effectiveness. Most companies 
never submitted that data, however, and the FDA did not follow
up.118 The fact that the FDA set a precedent of not adhering to its 
own post-market guidelines, since the inception of the regulatory 
standard, casts doubt on how effective the new Cures Act emphasis 
on post-market surveillance will be.
A troubling example of recent post-market surveillance failure is 
the case of female contraception. Conceptus pioneered the use of
a device called Essure: a permanent contraceptive that was devel-
oped in part to avoid the risks of tubal ligation surgery.119 The FDA 
fast-tracked the device because it offered “significant advantages 
over existing approved alternatives,” despite Conceptus not know-
ing the risks of long-term implantation.120 When Conceptus even-
tually conducted follow-up studies, they were not registered at Clin-
112. Id.
113. Jeffrey Shuren, FDA Is Working with Hospitals to Modernize Data Collection About Medical
Devices, FDA VOICE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.healthdataanswers.net/fda-working-
hospitals-modernize-data-collection-medical-devices/.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Parasidis, supra note 106, at 951.
117. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2018).
118. Fresh Air: Are Implanted Medical Devices Creating a “Danger Within Us”?, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/17/578562873/are-implanted-
medical-devices-creating-a-danger-within-us.
119. Jennifer Block, The Battle Over Essure, WASH. POST (July 26, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/style/2017/07/26/essure/.
120. Id.
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icalTrials.gov—though not legally required by the FDA—and their 
results were neither disseminated nor published.121
Over thirteen years later, the FDA has restricted the sale of Es-
sure due to safety and effectiveness problems and the need for ad-
ditional post-market studies.122 Large numbers of adverse events 
have been reported to the FDA through its Manufacturer and User 
Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database, including incom-
plete procedures, tubal perforations, intractable pain and bleeding 
leading to hysterectomies, possible device-related deaths, and 
hundreds of unintended pregnancies.123 The MAUDE database ag-
gregates adverse events reports voluntarily submitted by users of an 
FDA approved product. As of June 2015, a total of 5,093 Essure 
complaints had been submitted to MAUDE, finally motivating the 
FDA enough to reevaluate the device.124 Unfortunately, this num-
ber may only capture some of the issues Essure presents to women, 
as voluntary reporting typically underestimates adverse-events 
rates.125
The FDA acknowledges that medical device mishaps are un-
derreported.126 This is the result of what Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health director, Jeffrey Shuren, calls “passive surveil-
lance.”127 The FDA relies on manufacturers, hospitals, and con-
sumers to alert the agency of injuries, malfunctions, and other ad-
verse events linked to medical devices. However, even with prompt 
reliable reporting, it can take “months or even years for the FDA to 
detect patterns of failure.”128 With the limitations of underreport-
ing, biases, and lack of causality129, it is unsettling to think that the 
Cures Act is encouraging more post-market surveillance in device 
approvals when the reporting system lacks efficiency and efficacy.
The Cures Act’s effective streamlining of the medical device 
regulatory system relies in part on the efficacy of post-market sur-
veillance. This reliance may be misplaced in light of the systematic 
underreporting of adverse events by patients, doctors, hospitals 
and manufacturers, though. There are serious gaps in the post-
121. Sanket S. Dhurva et al., Revisiting Essure — Toward Safe and Effective Sterilization, 373
NEW ENG. J. MED. e17(1), e17(1)–(2) (2015).
122. Id. at e17(1); FDA Restricts Sale and Distribution of Essure to Protect Women and to Require 
That Patients Receive Risk Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm604098.htm.
123. Dhurva et al., supra note 121, at e17(1).
124. Id. at e17(2).
125. Parasidis, supra note 106, at 950–51.
126. Shelia Kaplan, F.D.A. Deal Would Relax Rules on Reporting Medical Device Problems, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/health/fda-medical-device-
problems-rules.html.
127. Shuren, supra note 113; see also Parasidis, supra note 106, at 953.
128. Kaplan, supra note 126.
129. INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 5 (2007).
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market surveillance system that will hinder the FDA’s ability to reli-
ably assess device safety and effectiveness. Unless the FDA acts to 
bolster their post-market regulation, patient safety under the Cures 
Act will be compromised. There are no studies yet which affirma-
tively show the connection between deregulation of the premarket 
approval process and harmful, risky medical devices; but, the scien-
tific literature is full of past examples of PMA review failure to 
catch harmful devices both premarket and post-market before they 
seriously, and in some cases irreparably, harm patients.130
IV. SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION MECHANISMS
Reliance on post-market information to approve medical devices 
in an effort to streamline the regulatory process is not an inherent-
ly bad idea. In fact, it is an innovative proposition that can get life-
saving medical devices to patients who desperately need them in a 
cost effective and timely way. It is likely that some, if not many, 
dangerous Class III medical devices will prematurely advance 
through the approval process and seriously harm patients, though.
This is a risk that a bipartisan Congress and the medical communi-
ty were willing to take. But, if Congress and medical device manu-
facturers are willing to risk patients’ physical and mental wellbeing 
with devices whose safety and effectiveness have not established 
prior to patient use, they should also be willing to compensate 
those patients who are harmed.
A. Judicial Remedy
Because Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. was decided on the basis of a 
regulatory framework that has since been legislatively altered, this 
Note argues the precedent should likewise be reevaluated. Unfor-
tunately, judicial action to overrule the holding seems far from 
likely. While the Cures Act amended several sections of the FDCA, 
130. See, e.g., Homa Alemzadeh, et al., Adverse Events in Robotic Surgery: A Retrospective 
Study of 14 Years of FDA Data, PLOS ONE, Oct. 2018, at 1 (analyzing failures in robotic sur-
gery); John Amoore & Paula Ingram, Learning From Adverse Incidents Involving Medical Devices,
NURSING STANDARD, Apr. 2003, at 41 (showing device malfunctions are multifactorial, but 
are due to malfunction of the device itself); Sheena Galhotra & Joseph Maurice, Assessment of 
Obstetric and Gynecologic Food and Drug Administration Device Approvals and Recalls, 25 J.
MINIMALLY INVASIVE GYNECOLOGY 1281, 1281 (2018) (showing increased risk to patients by 
improper device risk classification and increased device malfunctions); Tomas Zaremba et 
al., Risk of Device Malfunction in Cancer Patients With Implantable Cardiac Device Undergoing Radi-
otherapy: A Population-Based Cohort Study, 38 PACING CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 343 
(2015) (detailing cardiac device failure).
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it left § 360k(a), the express preemption clause cited by Justice 
Scalia in the Riegel opinion, intact. Thus, it would appear to be the 
legislative intent to leave Riegel’s essential holding untouched and 
keep the preemption clause for PMAs. The plain statutory lan-
guage of the text and legislative intent will most likely dissuade any 
judge from overruling the 2008 decision.
Despite the clear preemption foundation that Riegel was based 
upon, it would otherwise appear that the premise for the decision 
has changed. Justice Scalia emphasized the fact the PMA, unlike 
the 510k in Lohr, was a review of “safety and effectiveness;” that the 
PMA “is federal safety review”131 and thus consumers cannot make 
claims about safety. But can courts, Congress, patients, and the 
FDA really say the standard is still just as rigorous as in 2008 when 
post-market surveillance was a less powerful force in the regulatory 
process? The answer should be no.
The Cures Act § 3058 amendment states, “[n]othing in this par-
agraph alters the standards for premarket approval of a device.”132
The FDA, however, cannot guarantee this statement to be true—
especially when the statute mandates new review processes and 
regulatory standards that need to be put in place.133 Faulty devices 
passed through the rigorous pre-Cures Act PMA process, and faulty 
devices will continue to pass through the post-Cures Act PMA pro-
cess—likely at an even higher rate. Especially because the Cures 
Act relies more heavily on post-market data that will not reveal 
safety or effectiveness until years after approval and patient use. In 
the preceding section, this Note highlighted just a few examples of 
device and post-market surveillance failures that severely injured 
and caused deaths in many patients.
One 2018 study indicates that under the Cures Act, “4.6%-6% of 
PMA-approved devices will fail in such a way as to threaten death 
or serious and permanent harm.”134 And although as a society we 
are willing to exchange readily available innovative technology for 
less than 100% safety, the Cures Act “further tip[s] the balance 
away from ensuring device safety.”135 The Cures Act allows more 
room for uncertainty in approving the safety of medical devices in 
order to expedite innovative technology. It is changing the stand-
ard on which Riegel was decided. Thus, Riegel’s holding should be 
reconsidered.
131. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320–21 (2008).
132. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058(b)(5)(A)–(D), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1129 (2016).
133. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 72, at 19–28.
134. Horvath, supra note 1, at 992.
135. Id. at 991.
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As the only dissenter in the Riegel decision, Justice Ginsburg as-
sessed the fact that the MDA’s purpose was “to provide for the safe-
ty and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use” 
and yet that “‘Congress would, without comment, remove all 
means of judicial recourse for large numbers of consumers injured 
by defective medical devices.”136 Ginsburg made the point that the 
majority’s interpretation of the statute seemed to work against 
Congress’s original intent.
Justice Ginsburg also reviewed the history of the FDA’s regulato-
ry power. The FDCA has no explicit preemption clause for drugs 
and food additives, but the MDA imposed one in connection with 
the regulation of medical devices.137 The purpose of this decision 
was not to ban tort claims regarding medical devices, but rather “to 
empower the FDA to exercise control over state premarket approv-
al systems installed at a time when there was no preclearance at the 
federal level.”138 Prior to the MDA, states established their own reg-
ulatory systems of medical devices.139 By enacting the preemption 
clause § 360k(a) and (b), Congress simply wanted to place all state 
systems under the controlling authority of the FDA—not to bar 
state tort claims.140
The FDA itself further did not believe that at the time the MDA 
was enacted, all medical device manufacturers would be absolved 
of state tort liability. After the Lohr decision, Chief Counsel of the 
FDA, Margaret Porter, commented,
FDA’s view is that FDA product approval and state tort lia-
bility usually operate independently, each providing a sig-
nificant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection. FDA 
regulation of a device cannot anticipate and protect against 
all safety risks to individual consumers. Even the most thor-
ough regulation of a product such as a critical medical de-
vice may fail to identify potential problems presented by 
the product. Regulation cannot protect against all possible 
injuries that might result from use of a device over time. 
136. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 335–37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (first quoting 90 Stat. 539 pmbl.; 
then quoting Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
137. Id. at 340.
138. Id. at 341.
139. Id. at 343 n.14 (noting that “Congress featured California’s regulatory system in its 
discussion of § 360k(a), but it also identified California’s system as a prime candidate for an 
exemption from preemption under § 360k(b). . . . Congress sought not to terminate all state 
premarket approval systems, but rather to place those systems under the controlling authori-
ty of the FDA.”).
140. Id.
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Preemption of all such claims would result in the loss of a 
significant layer of consumer protection.141
The Lohr decision was predicated on the FDA standard of “equiva-
lence,” though, and the Riegel decision was predicated on the 
standard of “safety and effectiveness.” While Justice Ginsburg made 
compelling arguments against the majority’s decision in Riegel, it 
seems unlikely that the Court would be motivated to deviate from 
the plain statutory language of the text and legislative intent of the 
Cures Act.
B. Statutory Amendment
An alternative to judicial action is for Congress to pass an 
amendment providing relief to victims of malfunctioning devices.
After the Supreme Court came down with its decision in Riegel and 
more than 1,000 patient lawsuits involving the Sprint Fidelis tort 
claims were thrown out due to federal preemption, Democrats in 
Congress vowed to pass legislation that would override Riegel.142
Almost a decade later, though, such legislation remains to be an 
empty promise. With the recent passage of the Cures Act there ap-
pears to be a lack of political will in Congress to provide such re-
lief. Had Congress wanted to override Riegel, passage of the Cures 
Act would have been the time to do it. Yet it did not. This implies 
that Congress is satisfied with preemption for medical devices.
A congressional amendment to the preemption provision of the 
Cures Act appears to be the best way to hold device manufacturers 
accountable for their products and to compensate victims from the 
harms posed by unsafe medical devices. In 2009, after the Riegel
decision and after the Sprint Fidelis failure caught the media’s at-
tention,143 the Medical Device Safety Act of 2009 was introduced in 
the House.144 The bill’s opponents in Congress argued that remov-
ing preemption would inhibit innovation and delay the use of life 
saving technologies.145 Arguments against removing preemption 
141. Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD DRUG 
L.J. 7, 11 (2004).
142. Meier, supra note 87.
143. See, e.g., id.
144. Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (propos-
ing amendments to federal law that would clearly state that “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action for damages or the liability of any per-
son under the law of any State.”).
145. Michelle H. Lyu, House Subcommittee Holds Hearing to Overturn Riegel: H.R. 1346, The 
“Medical Device Safety Act of 2009”, REED SMITH LLP, May 13, 2009, https://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=e531c446-b39c-4fbf-b7a0-d94b18fc1e1d.
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also focused on the issue of clogging the court system and leaving 
safety and effectiveness concerns in the hands of inexpert juries.146
These opponents viewed preemption as a finely-struck balance be-
tween innovation and safety that they did not want to disturb.147
This bill never passed the House.
Statutory override used to be a common occurrence. Between 
1967 and 1990, Congress passed legislation that overrode 121 Su-
preme Court statutory interpretations.148 A congressional override 
of Riegel would have the effect of “modify[ing] the consequences of 
the decision, such that the same case would have been decided in 
the same way but subsequent cases would be decided differently.”149
However, due to “legislative paralysis brought on by congressional 
polarization,”150 congressional overrides have come almost to a 
standstill. This political polarization ultimately gives the Supreme 
Court the last word. Therefore, barring another Sprint Fidelis-
esque failure, it seems unlikely Congress will act to amend §
360k(a).
C. Establishing a Victim Compensation Fund
Another potential solution is for Congress to establish a medical 
device victim compensation fund modeled after the vaccine com-
pensation program. Vaccines are similarly situated in respect to 
high-risk medical devices: they are rigorously regulated by the FDA 
and go through clinical testing to ensure safety, efficacy, purity,
and potency of the product;151 the FDA even requires post-market 
surveillance to oversee specific questions about the vaccine’s safety 
and effectiveness while on the market.152 Vaccines save lives by pre-
venting diseases, but like many types of medicines, some serious 
health problems can arise due to vaccine injections.153 PMAs are 
approved on the same grounds of safety and effectiveness as vac-
cines; yet in the rare circumstances that patients are hurt, they are 
146. Id.
147. See generally Horvath, supra note 1.
148. William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991).
149. Id. at 332 n.1.
150. Adam Liptak, In Congress’ Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-
from-paralysis-of-congress.html.
151. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Vaccines, https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
Vaccines/default.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2018).
152. Id.
153. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.
https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) (“In 
very rare cases, a vaccine can cause a serious problem, such as a severe allergic reaction.”).
826 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 52:3
banned from seeking tort remedy. In the rare circumstances that 
patients are hurt by a vaccine, they have a compensation route. 
This same route should be open for victims of medical device mal-
functions.
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) is a 
simple way to provide compensation for injured patients either 
through direct compensation or settlement. The VICP acts as a no-
fault alternative to the traditional tort system.154 In 1986, Congress 
enacted the VICP as part of the Public Health Service Act, remov-
ing the mounting vaccine-related litigation from the judiciary into 
the executive branch.155 A number of administrative agencies man-
age VICP: HHS hosts it, conducts medical reviews of petitions, and 
makes Court-ordered compensation payments; the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) represents HHS in Court; and U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims makes the final decision regarding whether a petition is 
compensated and the type and amount of compensation.156
In the medical device context, a Medical Device Injury Compen-
sation Fund (MDICF) could act like the VICP and obtain funding 
by an excise tax on medical devices.157 The MDICF could impose 
penalties or premiums on device manufacturers that put defective 
products on the market. By taxing manufacturers proportionate to 
injury, this route would compensate victims as well as hold large 
and small manufacturers accountable in an equitable manner.
Delegating authority to administrative agencies, and away from 
the courts, has many potential benefits. For example, it relieves the 
tort system from mass tort cases that strain the judicial system—this 
addresses the criticism that removing preemption would clog the 
Courts with frivolous lawsuits.158 As in the vaccine circumstance, 
HHS can easily bring its medical device expertise to bear and more 
effectively adjudicate device failure claims. One benefit from the 
VICP is that “aggregation [of specific claims] can attract the sup-
port of skilled counsel and medical experts in early stages of the 
litigation, helping resolve both large and small claims.”159 In fact, 
agency adjudication for “group litigation may help resolve cases 
more efficiently in the long run.”160 Designating a special court 
154. Id.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2018).
156. Id. § 300aa-11; National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, supra note 153.
157. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, supra note 153 (providing that vaccines 
have a 75 cents excise tax per dose).
158. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administra-
tive Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993).
159. Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126
YALE L.J. 1634, 1698–99 (2017).
160. Id. at 1698.
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within HHS and the FDA has the potential to more efficient and 
effectively deal with medical device claims.
Centralizing these claims into a “Medical Device Court” also has 
the potential to “save cash-strapped government enforcers money 
by encouraging private parties to police misconduct when they 
bring claims on their own,”161 as seen in the vaccine context. As 
noted in Section III, the FDA can sometimes take a while to even 
realize there is a problem. This route would encourage private par-
ties to bring problems to the agency’s attention at a faster rate. En-
couraging the public to seek remedy for their injuries could enable 
the FDA to quickly detect patterns in device failure and thus re-
move the device from the market before more people are hurt.
This route is more beneficial for medical devices than it is for 
prescription drugs because medical devices are used at a much 
lower rate. Two studies illustrate this point in reviewing American 
consumption of medical innovation. First, in the case of prescrip-
tion drugs, “36.5% of adults aged 18–44, 69.6% of adults aged 45–
64, and 90.8% of those aged 65 and over took a prescription drug” 
during one month.162 In contrast, the study analyzing implantable 
medical devices found that “8% to 10% of the population in Amer-
ica and 5% to 6% of people in industrialized countries have expe-
rienced an implantable medical device for rebuilding body func-
tions, achieving a better quality of life, or expanding longevity.”163
These statics demonstrate that high-risk medical devices are used 
in much lower percentages than prescription drugs. Second, a
HHS 2016 survey shows that the vaccine rate of young children for 
select diseases averages around 80%.164 Higher percentages of pre-
scription drug use and vaccines occur in the United States, yet it is 
the smaller percentage of medical device usage that is barred from 
injury compensation. Creating a Medical Device Court can serve to 
remedy this disparity in an economical and fair manner.
There are several problems with instituting a compensation pro-
gram, however. First, Congress would have to enact an amendment 
to the FDCA delegating authority to HHS to adjudicate medical 
device failures. This seems unlikely. Without political pressure 
161. Id. at 1699.
162. NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 2017–1232, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2016:
WITH CHARTBOOK ON LONG-TERM HEALTH TRENDS 25 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus16.pdf#079.
163. Yeun-Ho Joung, Development of Implantable Medical Devices: From an Engineering Perspec-
tive, 17 INT’L NEUROUROLOGY J. 98 (2013). Note that while implantable devices do not con-
sist of all Class III medical devices, for purposes of this Note it is used to generally capture 
the amount of people that use higher risk devices.
164. Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 19–35 Months — United States, 2015, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/
65/wr/mm6539a4.htm (last updated Aug. 17, 2017).
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from the public or medical community, it seems doubtful that 
Congress would prioritize this issue. Second, in the vaccine con-
text, injury is rare.165 But in the medical device context, faulty 
products can affect hundreds of thousands of patients.166 The med-
ical device fund would have to be significantly larger than the 
VICP. There would be intense pushback from medical manufac-
turers if they were forced to contribute to this type of fund. It is al-
so possible that the fund would be insufficient to cover all injured 
patients, and some would still be left without recourse. These 
drawbacks indicate that a specialized court could be overwhelmed 
and not cost effective. But despite the weaknesses of this solution, 
Congress should consider providing an alternative compensation 
mechanism for patients injured by faulty medical products.
CONCLUSION
Deregulation and streamlining the efficiency of the FDA medi-
cal device regulatory system is a great and necessary idea, but not 
at the cost of patient safety and reducing a patient’s ability to be 
made whole. The Cures Act introduces innovative new pathways 
that encourage innovation and speed to the process of regulatory 
approval. The Cures Act tips the balance between innovation and 
patient safety, though. The Cures Act introduces more risk of pa-
tient injury because of the deregulatory effects on high-risk medi-
cal device approval. Thus, the Court’s Riegel decision should be re-
considered. This Note considered the likelihood of the Court 
overruling Riegel and rejected this as unlikely. Likewise, because 
Congress passed the Cures Act without removing the preemption
and has in the past rejected other bills targeted at removing 
preemption, Congressional override of Riegel is also unlikely. This 
Note favors a solution where Congress creates a victim compensa-
tion fund for injured patients modeled after the VICP. If medical 
devices have a greater likelihood of injuring patients, then those 
patients should have the option of holding medical device manu-
facturers accountable. It is not only unjust to accept irreparable 
harm inflicted on patients, it is unnecessary.
165. Susan G. Clark, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, 94 ED. LAW REP. 671, 674 (1994); see also National Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program , supra note 153 (noting that most people who get vaccines have no serious 
problems). Vaccines, like any medicines, can cause side effects, but most are very rare and 
very mild. Some health problems that follow vaccinations are not caused by vaccines. Id.
166. Block, supra note 119; Thomas, supra note 96.
